MCF-SEC-001 Human Identity
Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-07, CG-13
Objective. Ensure every person who can observe, configure or command facility OT, infrastructure management planes or AI control planes is uniquely identified, strongly authenticated and lifecycle-managed, with no shared or orphaned accounts.
Requirement and evidence
The identity and access manager shall ensure that every human identity with access to BMS, EPMS, CDU and PLC engineering workstations and HMIs, BMC/Redfish interfaces, network devices, hypervisor and Kubernetes control planes, cluster managers and storage controllers is individually attributable, uses phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication where the system supports it (with compensating controls recorded where it does not, for example legacy HMIs), and is joined, moved and removed through an authoritative identity source within defined deadlines. The OT security owner shall maintain an inventory of OT systems that cannot integrate with central identity and the compensating controls applied.
Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.
MCF-SEC-002 Machine Identity
Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-08
Objective. Ensure machine identities (service accounts, API tokens, certificates, workload identities, node and device identities) used by automation, controllers and agents are inventoried, scoped, rotated and, for hardware, anchored in a root of trust with attestation.
Requirement and evidence
The platform security lead shall maintain an inventory of machine identities with access to in-scope infrastructure, including owner, purpose, scope, credential type, rotation interval and expiry, and shall prohibit long-lived static credentials for consequential authority where short-lived or certificate-based credentials are supported. The platform security lead shall require hardware-rooted identity (for example TPM or device identity certificates) and boot or firmware attestation (for example via SPDM or TPM quotes) for accelerator nodes, BMCs and fabric devices that support it, and shall gate cluster admission on successful attestation.
Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.
MCF-SEC-003 Privileged Access
Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-07
Objective. Ensure privileged and consequential authority over facility OT, BMC/Redfish, network, hypervisor/Kubernetes, cluster manager and storage control planes is least-privilege, brokered, time-bound and monitored, so no single compromised identity can command cross-domain infrastructure.
Requirement and evidence
The infrastructure security owner shall define privileged roles by authority action (observe, configure, command, bypass, update, revoke, recover, per AIDCF-005) and by domain, shall prohibit standing cross-domain privileged roles (for example a single role with write access to both BMS/EPMS and cluster control planes) except as approved break-glass, and shall broker privileged sessions through a privileged access management (PAM) system or jump hosts providing just-in-time elevation, session recording and approval for command and bypass actions. The infrastructure security owner shall test at a defined interval that privilege boundaries hold, including that elevation requires approval and that sessions are recorded.
Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY, RECOVERY.
MCF-SEC-004 Break-Glass Governance
Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-10
Objective. Ensure emergency accounts and procedures across OT, infrastructure and control planes work when central identity fails, are protected against misuse, and every use is reviewed.
Requirement and evidence
The infrastructure security owner shall govern break-glass arrangements for all in-scope domains: inventory of emergency accounts, storage under dual control with an offline copy outside the failure domains they recover, use triggers, notification on use, maximum duration, mandatory post-use review and credential rotation. The infrastructure security owner shall verify at a defined interval that break-glass retrieval and login work with the primary identity provider and vault unavailable, and shall review all uses.
Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4. Operating states: EMERGENCY, FAILED, RECOVERY.