15 domains · Ecosystem and authority

SEC Digital, OT and Control-Plane Security

6 families and 24 controls. Critical to CG-07 Critical control-system integrity, CG-15 Integrated digital authority over infrastructure.

SEC domain guideSee it in the explorer

Proposed text. Requirements are from registry v1.1 (status CANDIDATE), proposed under amendment AMD-002. Intervals and thresholds are set by the assessed organisation in its capability profile. The approved v1.0 baseline uses the same identifiers.

24 controls

SEC-01 Identity and privileged access

MCF-SEC-001 Human Identity

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-07, CG-13

Objective. Ensure every person who can observe, configure or command facility OT, infrastructure management planes or AI control planes is uniquely identified, strongly authenticated and lifecycle-managed, with no shared or orphaned accounts.

Requirement and evidence

The identity and access manager shall ensure that every human identity with access to BMS, EPMS, CDU and PLC engineering workstations and HMIs, BMC/Redfish interfaces, network devices, hypervisor and Kubernetes control planes, cluster managers and storage controllers is individually attributable, uses phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication where the system supports it (with compensating controls recorded where it does not, for example legacy HMIs), and is joined, moved and removed through an authoritative identity source within defined deadlines. The OT security owner shall maintain an inventory of OT systems that cannot integrate with central identity and the compensating controls applied.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SEC-002 Machine Identity

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-08

Objective. Ensure machine identities (service accounts, API tokens, certificates, workload identities, node and device identities) used by automation, controllers and agents are inventoried, scoped, rotated and, for hardware, anchored in a root of trust with attestation.

Requirement and evidence

The platform security lead shall maintain an inventory of machine identities with access to in-scope infrastructure, including owner, purpose, scope, credential type, rotation interval and expiry, and shall prohibit long-lived static credentials for consequential authority where short-lived or certificate-based credentials are supported. The platform security lead shall require hardware-rooted identity (for example TPM or device identity certificates) and boot or firmware attestation (for example via SPDM or TPM quotes) for accelerator nodes, BMCs and fabric devices that support it, and shall gate cluster admission on successful attestation.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

MCF-SEC-003 Privileged Access

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-07

Objective. Ensure privileged and consequential authority over facility OT, BMC/Redfish, network, hypervisor/Kubernetes, cluster manager and storage control planes is least-privilege, brokered, time-bound and monitored, so no single compromised identity can command cross-domain infrastructure.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall define privileged roles by authority action (observe, configure, command, bypass, update, revoke, recover, per AIDCF-005) and by domain, shall prohibit standing cross-domain privileged roles (for example a single role with write access to both BMS/EPMS and cluster control planes) except as approved break-glass, and shall broker privileged sessions through a privileged access management (PAM) system or jump hosts providing just-in-time elevation, session recording and approval for command and bypass actions. The infrastructure security owner shall test at a defined interval that privilege boundaries hold, including that elevation requires approval and that sessions are recorded.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY, RECOVERY.

MCF-SEC-004 Break-Glass Governance

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-10

Objective. Ensure emergency accounts and procedures across OT, infrastructure and control planes work when central identity fails, are protected against misuse, and every use is reviewed.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall govern break-glass arrangements for all in-scope domains: inventory of emergency accounts, storage under dual control with an offline copy outside the failure domains they recover, use triggers, notification on use, maximum duration, mandatory post-use review and credential rotation. The infrastructure security owner shall verify at a defined interval that break-glass retrieval and login work with the primary identity provider and vault unavailable, and shall review all uses.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4. Operating states: EMERGENCY, FAILED, RECOVERY.

SEC-02 Control-plane protection

MCF-SEC-005 BMS and EPMS Security

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-07Supports CG-15, CG-05, CG-06

Objective. Ensure building management, electrical power monitoring, CDU and PLC/SCADA systems that monitor and command power and cooling are secured to a target security level appropriate to their consequence, so compromise or misuse cannot defeat electrical or thermal continuity.

Requirement and evidence

The OT security owner shall perform a security risk assessment for BMS, EPMS, CDU controllers, PLCs, SCADA servers, historians and engineering workstations using a zone-and-conduit approach consistent with ISA/IEC 62443, assign a target security level (SL-T) to each zone, and implement countermeasures across the foundational requirement areas (identification and authentication, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events, resource availability). The facility owner shall ensure that safety-instrumented and protection functions (electrical protection relays, emergency shutdown, hardwired interlocks) are independent of BMS/EPMS networks, and the OT security owner shall verify by test that unauthorised write or command attempts against controllers are blocked or detected and that controllers fail to a defined safe state on loss of supervisory communication.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, DEGRADED, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SEC-006 Cluster Manager Security

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-08

Objective. Ensure the AI control plane (Kubernetes or HPC scheduler, cluster manager, provisioning and image services, hypervisor managers) cannot be used to gain unbounded authority over compute, data and connected infrastructure.

Requirement and evidence

The platform security lead shall harden each cluster manager and control plane to a documented benchmark (for example CIS Kubernetes Benchmark where applicable), restrict API server and scheduler administrative access to brokered privileged paths, enforce admission control that blocks privileged containers, host-namespace access and unapproved images on accelerator nodes, protect control-plane state stores (for example etcd) with encryption and access restriction, and separate tenant-facing from infrastructure-administrative interfaces. The platform security lead shall test at a defined interval that a tenant or workload identity cannot escalate to node, cluster-admin or BMC authority.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

MCF-SEC-007 Fabric Controller Security

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-15, CG-08

Objective. Ensure fabric controllers, subnet managers, SDN controllers and network automation platforms are protected so that their compromise cannot reconfigure, partition or blackhole fabrics.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall ensure fabric controllers, subnet managers and network automation platforms are reachable only from the management zone, use individually attributable and brokered administrative access, authenticate southbound connections to devices (for example certificate-based gNMI/NETCONF), protect fabric security keys (for example InfiniBand management and partition keys), and log all configuration actions to the security telemetry platform. The fabric operations lead shall reconcile controller access configuration to this requirement at a defined interval.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE.

MCF-SEC-008 Storage Controller Security

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-15, CG-10, CG-08

Objective. Ensure storage management planes cannot be used to destroy, encrypt or exfiltrate training data, checkpoints and model artefacts, and that destructive operations require additional protection.

Requirement and evidence

The storage platform owner shall restrict storage controller and management interfaces to the management zone with brokered privileged access, shall require multi-person approval or delayed execution for destructive operations (volume or bucket deletion, snapshot or retention policy reduction, replication break), shall protect immutable recovery copies with retention locks that administrators cannot shorten, and shall log management actions to security telemetry.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

SEC-03 Network security and segmentation

MCF-SEC-009 Security Zoning

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-07Supports CG-15, CG-09

Objective. Ensure the facility OT, infrastructure management, AI control-plane, tenant and corporate environments are partitioned into security zones with defined conduits, so that compromise in one zone cannot reach consequential authority in another.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall maintain a zone-and-conduit model covering facility OT (BMS, EPMS, CDU, PLC, fire and physical security integrations), infrastructure management (BMC, PDU, switch management, OOB), AI control planes, storage management, tenant and corporate networks and external connections, with each conduit's permitted flows, protocols and direction, and the security level target per zone. The OT security owner shall reconcile the as-built network (firewall rules, VLAN/VRF configuration, physical links, wireless and cellular devices) to the model at a defined interval and after change, and shall record every undocumented path (including dual-homed hosts and vendor-installed modems) as a Finding.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SEC-010 Management-Plane Segmentation

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-07

Objective. Ensure management planes (BMC/IPMI/Redfish, switch management, PDU, hypervisor and Kubernetes administrative APIs, storage management) are segmented so that tenant, workload and corporate networks cannot reach them, and so that one management plane cannot be used to pivot to another.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall segment each management plane into its own zone, shall disable insecure management protocols (for example IPMI over LAN where Redfish is available, unauthenticated SNMP versions, Telnet), shall restrict BMC access to brokered administrative paths, and shall prevent host operating systems from reaching their own or other BMCs over the network except where required and approved. The infrastructure security owner shall test at a defined interval from representative tenant, workload and corporate vantage points that management interfaces are unreachable and that pivoting between management planes is blocked.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

MCF-SEC-011 Filtering and Gateways

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S3Supports CG-07, CG-15

Objective. Ensure conduits between zones are enforced by managed boundary devices whose rule sets are minimal, reviewed and monitored, including industrial DMZs, unidirectional gateways and API gateways for automation.

Requirement and evidence

The security operations manager shall operate boundary devices on every conduit in the zone model with deny-by-default rule sets, documented business justification and owner for each rule, review of rules at a defined interval, removal of unused rules, and logging of denied and permitted consequential flows to security telemetry. The OT security owner shall use unidirectional or protocol-break gateways where the zone model requires one-way data export from power and cooling control zones.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E1, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE.

MCF-SEC-012 Remote Access

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-07

Objective. Ensure all remote access to OT, infrastructure management and AI control planes, especially by vendors and OEMs, is brokered, approved per session, time-bound, monitored and revocable.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall permit remote access to in-scope systems only through a managed remote-access gateway that enforces individual identity, MFA, per-session approval by the system owner for vendor and OEM access, time limits, session recording and the ability to terminate sessions in real time, and shall prohibit persistent vendor connections, vendor-installed remote-access tools and modems. The OT security owner shall require that remote sessions to power and cooling control systems with write or command capability are supervised by an on-site or on-shift authorised operator.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

SEC-04 Configuration, vulnerability and patching

MCF-SEC-013 Secure Baseline

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-07, CG-15, CG-08

Objective. Ensure OT controllers, BMCs, accelerator nodes, NICs, switches and control-plane hosts run hardened configurations and integrity-verified firmware with secure boot, so that tampered or insecure states are prevented or detected.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall define secure configuration baselines for each in-scope device class, including disabled unused services, credential policy, logging, and for firmware-bearing devices the approved signed firmware versions, secure boot enablement, firmware rollback protection and measured boot where supported. The platform security lead shall verify compliance with the baseline at a defined interval using automated assessment or attestation and shall record non-compliant devices as Findings.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

MCF-SEC-014 Vulnerability Management

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S3Supports CG-07, CG-15

Objective. Ensure vulnerabilities in OT, infrastructure management, firmware and AI control-plane components are identified, prioritised by exploitability and infrastructure consequence, and remediated or mitigated within defined times.

Requirement and evidence

The security operations manager shall maintain vulnerability visibility for all in-scope asset classes (including passive or vendor-advisory-based identification for OT assets that cannot be actively scanned), shall prioritise using exploitation evidence (for example known-exploited catalogues) and infrastructure consequence (reachability to CG-05/CG-06/CG-07/CG-15 authority), and shall meet remediation or mitigation times defined per priority. The security operations manager shall report overdue items to governance.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E1, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE.

MCF-SEC-015 Patch Governance

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S3Supports CG-14, CG-07

Objective. Ensure security patches and firmware updates to OT and infrastructure are tested for compatibility and operational impact, staged to avoid common-mode failure, and applied within defined times.

Requirement and evidence

The change authority shall require that patches and firmware updates to OT controllers, BMCs, NICs, switches, accelerator nodes and control planes are tested on representative test systems, approved by the system owner and, for OT, the vendor where required, applied in stages that never update all redundant members or all fault domains simultaneously, and verified after application with rollback available. The security operations manager shall measure patch latency against defined targets.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E1, E7. Operating states: MAINTENANCE, TRANSITION, NORMAL.

MCF-SEC-016 Exception and Compensating Control

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S3Supports CG-07, CG-15

Objective. Ensure security exceptions (unpatchable OT, legacy protocols, missing MFA) are approved by appropriate authority, time-bound and backed by verified compensating controls.

Requirement and evidence

The infrastructure security owner shall maintain a security exception register for in-scope systems recording the deviation, risk assessment including infrastructure consequence, compensating controls, approver at the authority level required by consequence, and expiry. The infrastructure security owner shall verify compensating controls are in place before approval and at renewal.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE.

SEC-05 Detection and response

MCF-SEC-017 Security Telemetry

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S3Supports CG-15, CG-07

Objective. Ensure security-relevant logs and events from OT, management planes, control planes, remote access and identity systems are collected centrally with integrity, time synchronisation and retention sufficient for detection and investigation.

Requirement and evidence

The security operations manager shall collect security telemetry from identity providers, PAM, remote-access gateways, boundary devices, BMCs, network devices, fabric controllers, cluster managers, storage controllers and OT passive monitoring (including controller write and program-change events), with time synchronised to NET-024 sources, integrity protection, and retention per the evidence retention class, and shall monitor source health and alert on silent sources.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E1, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY, RECOVERY.

MCF-SEC-018 Behaviour Detection

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-07

Objective. Ensure detection of anomalous or malicious behaviour against infrastructure authority, including unexpected OT writes, BMC firmware operations, mass configuration changes, privilege escalation and anomalous automation actions.

Requirement and evidence

The security operations manager shall maintain detection use cases mapped to infrastructure threat scenarios (for example ATT&CK for ICS techniques and AIDCF-004 scenarios X05, X08, X15), covering unexpected controller writes or program changes, BMC firmware update or power commands outside change windows, mass configuration pushes, privilege escalation, anomalous remote sessions and automation acting outside its scope, and shall validate detection effectiveness by safe simulation at a defined interval.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SEC-019 Incident Containment

Claim resilienceAssurance level AL5Tier CP-5Evidence floor S4Supports CG-09, CG-15, CG-07, CG-10

Objective. Ensure cyber and cyber-physical incidents affecting infrastructure can be contained without causing unsafe states or unnecessary loss of AI service, with pre-approved containment actions and safety-coordinated decision-making.

Requirement and evidence

The security operations manager shall maintain incident playbooks for infrastructure scenarios (BMS/EPMS compromise, BMC compromise, control-plane compromise, malicious automation, vendor account compromise) that define pre-approved containment actions (credential revocation, conduit closure, session termination, controller isolation to local or manual control), the safety checks required before each action, and the decision authority. The facility owner shall ensure that OT containment actions are coordinated with facility operations so that isolating supervisory control does not remove cooling or power continuity, and the security operations manager shall exercise the playbooks at a defined interval.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: EMERGENCY, DEGRADED, RECOVERY.

MCF-SEC-020 Forensic Readiness

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-15

Objective. Ensure that evidence needed to investigate infrastructure incidents (logs, controller programs, firmware images, session recordings) is preserved with chain of custody and that collection does not endanger operations.

Requirement and evidence

The security operations manager shall define forensic collection procedures for each in-scope system class, including OT controllers and BMCs, specifying what to collect, how to collect safely, and chain-of-custody requirements, and shall ensure retention and legal hold capability for telemetry and session recordings. The OT security owner shall ensure baseline copies of controller programs and firmware hashes are available for comparison.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E5, E6. Operating states: EMERGENCY, RECOVERY.

SEC-06 AI-enabled and automated action

MCF-SEC-021 Agent or Automation Authority

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-07

Objective. Ensure every AI agent, automation pipeline and closed-loop controller that can act on infrastructure has an explicit, bounded and inventoried authority scope, so that tool-mediated actions cannot exceed what the owner approved.

Requirement and evidence

The automation owner shall register every agent, automation and closed-loop control that can observe, configure, command, bypass, update or recover infrastructure (including AIOps remediation, cooling optimisation loops, power capping, network automation and AI agents with tool access), stating its effective identity, tools and APIs, target systems, permitted actions, rate and magnitude limits, operating states in which it may act, and its human owner. The infrastructure security owner shall reconcile registered scope with effective permissions at a defined interval and shall prohibit any automation from holding cross-domain command or bypass authority without approval under SEC-003.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E7 Derived and analytical. Optional: E4. Operating states: NORMAL, DEGRADED, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SEC-022 Approval Controls

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-14

Objective. Ensure consequential automated or agent-initiated infrastructure actions require human approval proportionate to consequence, and that approvals cannot be bypassed.

Requirement and evidence

The automation owner shall classify each automated action by consequence and reversibility and shall require human approval (single or dual) for actions above the defined threshold, such as OT setpoint or mode changes beyond limits, power-cycling beyond one fault domain, firmware updates, fabric-wide configuration pushes and destructive storage operations. The infrastructure security owner shall verify by test that approval cannot be bypassed by the automation's own identity.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SEC-023 Command Allowlisting

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-07Supports CG-15

Objective. Ensure that only explicitly allowlisted commands, write operations and parameter ranges can be issued to power, cooling and critical infrastructure controllers by any automated or remote actor, enforced at a point the actor cannot modify.

Requirement and evidence

The OT security owner shall enforce, at a boundary or broker the actor cannot modify (for example an OT protocol-aware gateway, a command broker or controller-level write protection), an allowlist of permitted commands, registers or objects, and parameter ranges for writes to BMS, EPMS, CDU and PLC systems from automation, agents and remote sessions, and shall block or require approval for anything outside the list. The OT security owner shall test at a defined interval that out-of-list writes and out-of-range values are blocked and alarmed.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SEC-024 Safe Rollback

Claim resilienceAssurance level AL5Tier CP-5Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-10, CG-07

Objective. Ensure automated or agent-initiated infrastructure changes can be detected, halted and reversed to a known-safe state quickly, including when the automation itself has failed or been compromised.

Requirement and evidence

The automation owner shall provide, for every registered automation and agent, a kill switch that halts its actions without depending on the automation itself, a record of actions taken sufficient to reverse them, and a defined safe state (for example last approved setpoints, previous configuration) for each target. The automation owner shall test at a defined interval that the kill switch halts actions within target time and that rollback restores the safe state, coordinating OT rollback with facility operations.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, EMERGENCY, RECOVERY, DEGRADED.

Source: controls.csv, evidence-profiles.csv and gate-mappings.csv.