15 domains · Ecosystem and authority

SUP Supply Chain, OEM and Ecosystem Assurance

6 families and 24 controls. Critical to CG-03 Critical dependency visibility, CG-15 Integrated digital authority over infrastructure.

SUP domain guideSee it in the explorer

Proposed text. Requirements are from registry v1.1 (status CANDIDATE), proposed under amendment AMD-002. Intervals and thresholds are set by the assessed organisation in its capability profile. The approved v1.0 baseline uses the same identifiers.

24 controls

SUP-01 Supplier due diligence

MCF-SUP-001 Supplier Capability

Claim designAssurance level AL2Tier CP-1Evidence floor S3Supports CG-03

Objective. Suppliers of critical equipment and services are shown, before award and at renewal, to have the technical, manufacturing, integration, installation and field-support capability required by the Capability Instance at the site and scale proposed.

Requirement and evidence

The procurement lead shall perform and record a capability assessment for each supplier of a critical asset class or service before award and at renewal, covering engineering competence, manufacturing and test capacity (including factory acceptance testing), rack-scale or skid integration capability where applicable, installation and commissioning resources, field-service coverage and response at the site, and references for comparable deployments. A competent engineer shall approve the technical part of the assessment.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E7 Derived and analytical. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL.

MCF-SUP-002 Financial and Operational Resilience

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-03

Objective. The financial health, manufacturing footprint, allocation exposure and business-continuity capability of critical suppliers are monitored so that supplier distress or disruption is detected early enough to act.

Requirement and evidence

The supplier manager shall monitor each critical supplier at the profile interval for financial distress indicators, manufacturing and logistics concentration (single plant or region), allocation or quota exposure (for example accelerator allocations), sanctions and export-control exposure, and business-continuity arrangements, and shall escalate adverse changes to the capability owner with a proposed treatment.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL.

MCF-SUP-003 Security and Quality Posture

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-08, CG-15

Objective. Critical suppliers operate quality management and secure development practices adequate for products that will run, control or protect AI infrastructure, including product security incident response for firmware and control software.

Requirement and evidence

The procurement lead shall obtain and evaluate evidence of each critical supplier's quality management system, product security development lifecycle for firmware and control software, product security incident response (PSIRT) and vulnerability disclosure process, and factory test and outgoing quality controls. The procurement lead shall record identified gaps with contract conditions and shall track incoming quality (defects on receipt, early-life failures) for each supplier.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL.

MCF-SUP-004 Sub-Tier Visibility

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-03

Objective. Critical sub-tier dependencies behind first-tier suppliers (for example high-bandwidth memory and advanced packaging for accelerators, laser and optical components, transformer core steel and bushings, switchgear breaker mechanisms, CDU pumps and heat exchangers, battery cells, controller chipsets, and contract manufacturers) are known well enough to reveal shared sub-tier sources across nominally diverse suppliers.

Requirement and evidence

The procurement lead shall obtain, for each critical asset class, disclosure of material sub-tier suppliers and manufacturing locations from first-tier suppliers, record them in the dependency graph, and identify sub-tier sources shared across nominally diverse first-tier suppliers. Where a supplier declines disclosure, the procurement lead shall record an UNKNOWN Record and the capability owner shall decide on treatment.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL, RECOVERY.

SUP-02 Contract and service obligations

MCF-SUP-005 Service Levels

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-10, CG-13

Objective. Contracts for maintenance, support and supply of critical systems contain measurable service levels (response, on-site attendance, restore, parts availability, RMA turnaround) that are consistent with the Service Outcome and recovery tolerances.

Requirement and evidence

The supplier manager shall ensure each critical support or maintenance contract states measurable service levels with units, measurement points, exclusions and escalation, and shall document that each service level is consistent with the time-to-impact and recovery tolerances in DEP-003 and CAP-02. Where contracted levels are inconsistent, the capability owner shall record the gap and its treatment (on-site spares, resident engineers, alternative supplier).

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL, EMERGENCY, RECOVERY.

MCF-SUP-006 Evidence Rights

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-03

Objective. The owner has contractual rights to obtain the evidence needed to assess supplier-provided and provider-operated functions: test and commissioning records, maintenance records, firmware SBOMs and release notes, telemetry access, incident RCAs, audit reports and access for witness testing and audit.

Requirement and evidence

The supplier manager shall ensure that each critical supplier and provider contract grants rights to the evidence listed in the AIDCF-008 control evidence profiles relevant to the supplied function, within stated timescales and formats, including rights to witness tests and to audit or receive independent assurance reports, and shall record any evidence the supplier will not provide as an UNKNOWN Record against the affected controls.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL.

MCF-SUP-007 Incident Notification

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-03, CG-15

Objective. Suppliers and providers notify the owner promptly of incidents, vulnerabilities, field notices, recalls, allocation changes and planned changes that could affect supplied functions, and the notifications reach the people who must act.

Requirement and evidence

The supplier manager shall ensure critical supplier and provider contracts define notification obligations and timescales for incidents, security vulnerabilities, field notices and recalls, planned maintenance and changes, and allocation or end-of-life changes, and shall operate a monitored intake (shared mailbox, portal subscription, ticket integration) that routes notifications to the responsible owner. The supplier manager shall test the intake path at the profile interval.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, DEGRADED.

MCF-SUP-008 Exit and Transition Rights

Claim designAssurance level AL2Tier CP-1Evidence floor S3Supports CG-10

Objective. The owner can exit or replace a critical supplier or provider without losing the ability to operate, maintain or recover critical systems, including access to configuration, control logic, data, documentation, licences, spares and transition assistance.

Requirement and evidence

The supplier manager shall ensure each critical contract provides exit and transition rights proportionate to the dependency, including export of configuration and operational data in usable formats, ownership or escrow of control logic and configuration for programmable controllers, perpetual or transition licences for software required to operate installed equipment, option to purchase spares and tools, documentation hand-over, and transition assistance for a stated period. The capability owner shall maintain an exit plan for each sole-source or high-concentration supplier.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E7 Derived and analytical. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL, TRANSITION.

SUP-03 Hardware and component provenance

MCF-SUP-009 Approved Sourcing

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-08, CG-04

Objective. Critical components (protection devices, circuit breakers and trip units, relays, UPS modules and batteries, accelerators and boards, memory, optics, NICs/DPUs, storage media, controllers and sensors) are purchased only from the OEM or OEM-authorised channels, so that counterfeit, grey-market, refurbished-as-new and tampered parts are excluded at source.

Requirement and evidence

The procurement lead shall maintain an approved source list for each critical component class naming the OEM and authorised distributors, shall configure purchasing controls so that orders for critical classes can be placed only with approved sources, and shall require documented engineering approval and enhanced inspection (MCF-SUP-010) for any exception, such as broker purchase of obsolete parts.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL, RECOVERY.

MCF-SUP-010 Counterfeit Prevention

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-04, CG-08

Objective. Counterfeit, cloned, remarked or tampered components are detected at receipt, before installation, by inspection and test proportionate to risk, and suspect parts are quarantined and reported.

Requirement and evidence

The receiving and engineering leads shall operate a risk-based incoming inspection for critical component classes, including label, serial and packaging verification against OEM records, physical inspection, and where risk warrants electrical or functional testing (for example protection device trip testing, optics DOM/EEPROM checks, firmware identity checks on boards). Suspect items shall be quarantined, reported to the OEM and, where required, to the relevant authority, and shall not be installed until cleared.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, RECOVERY.

MCF-SUP-011 Chain of Custody

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-08

Objective. High-value and integrity-sensitive equipment (accelerator systems, storage media, network gear, controllers, spare boards) is under recorded custody from the factory or integrator to installation, so that theft, substitution and tampering in transit or staging are prevented or detected.

Requirement and evidence

The logistics lead shall require tamper-evident packaging and seals for critical shipments, recorded hand-offs between factory, freight forwarder, carrier and site, secure staging areas with access control, and receipt verification of seals and serials against the advance shipping notice. Breaks in custody or seal anomalies shall be recorded as security events and the affected items quarantined pending inspection.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL.

MCF-SUP-012 Component Traceability

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Supports CG-08, CG-03

Objective. Critical installed components can be traced by serial number, part number, revision and firmware to their location and the functions they support, quickly enough to act on a field notice, recall or vulnerability before it causes harm.

Requirement and evidence

The asset manager shall record serial, part number, hardware revision and firmware version for critical components (accelerators and boards, NICs/DPUs, optics, switch line cards, storage media, breaker trip units, relays, UPS modules, batteries, CDU pumps and controllers) in the asset register linked to location and Required Function, and shall demonstrate at the profile interval, by exercise, that all units affected by a given notice can be identified within the target time.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E6, E7. Operating states: NORMAL.

SUP-04 Software, firmware and update supply

MCF-SUP-013 Release Provenance

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S3Supports CG-15, CG-14

Objective. Every firmware, software and configuration package deployed to AI and facility infrastructure (accelerator and board firmware, BMC/BIOS, NIC/DPU firmware, switch OS, storage controller software, drivers and runtime stacks, UPS/PDU/ATS firmware, BMS/EPMS software, CDU and PLC logic) comes from an authenticated source with release notes and component inventory, and is held in a controlled internal repository before deployment.

Requirement and evidence

The platform and control-system owners shall obtain releases only from authenticated OEM channels, record for each release its origin, version, hash, release notes and software bill of materials where available, store it in a controlled repository with access control and integrity protection, and deploy only from that repository. Releases for programmable facility controllers shall be held with the same controls as IT firmware.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

MCF-SUP-014 Signature Validation

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-08

Objective. Firmware and software are cryptographically verified before installation and, where the platform supports it, at boot, so that modified or malicious images are rejected.

Requirement and evidence

The platform and control-system owners shall verify OEM signatures (or, where signing is unavailable, OEM-published hashes obtained over an authenticated channel) before staging any release to the repository and before deployment, shall enable platform secure-boot and firmware-signature enforcement where supported (for example on BMCs, accelerators, NICs/DPUs, switches), and shall record device classes that cannot enforce signatures with compensating controls. The owners shall demonstrate rejection of an unsigned or altered image on a non-production device for each enforcing device class.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E6, E7. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

MCF-SUP-015 Compatibility Assurance

Claim effectivenessAssurance level AL5Tier CP-4Evidence floor S4Supports CG-14, CG-08, CG-09

Objective. Firmware, driver and software updates are deployed only in combinations that are validated as compatible, and are rolled out in stages aligned to fault domains so that a defective release cannot defeat redundant capacity at once.

Requirement and evidence

The platform owner shall maintain a compatibility matrix for interdependent components (for example accelerator firmware, driver and runtime libraries, NIC/DPU firmware, switch OS, BMC/BIOS, storage client; and for facility systems UPS firmware and EPMS, CDU controller and BMS integration), shall test each new combination on a representative non-production environment, and shall deploy through staged waves where each wave is confined to one fault domain and passes defined health criteria before the next begins. Redundant members of a group shall not be updated in the same wave.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E6, E7. Operating states: MAINTENANCE, TRANSITION, NORMAL.

MCF-SUP-016 Vulnerability Response

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15

Objective. Vulnerabilities disclosed by suppliers for firmware, OT controllers and AI infrastructure components are triaged, and fixes or compensating controls are applied within timescales proportionate to exposure and consequence.

Requirement and evidence

The security owner shall track supplier advisories for in-scope products, triage each against the asset register and exposure (network reachability, privilege required), assign a remediation target based on severity and consequence, and record either patch deployment through change control or a compensating control with approved exception. The security owner shall report remediation performance to the accountable owner.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE.

SUP-05 Spares, logistics and obsolescence

MCF-SUP-017 Critical Spares

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-10, CG-05, CG-06

Objective. Spares for critical assets are held in the quantity, location and condition needed to restore Required Functions within tolerance, based on failure behaviour, installed population, repair time and resupply lead time, rather than on habit or warranty terms.

Requirement and evidence

The maintenance manager shall define a spares strategy for each critical asset class (for example UPS modules and capacitors, battery strings, breakers and trip units, protection relays, generator starter motors and controllers, CDU pumps and controllers, chiller compressors and VFDs, transformer bushings or, where justified, a strategic spare transformer, accelerator trays or boards, NICs, optics, switch line cards, storage drives), stating stock level, location (on site, regional, OEM-held), basis (population, failure rate, MTTR target, lead time) and condition-maintenance requirements for stored spares. The maintenance manager shall reconcile stock to records at the profile interval and replenish below-minimum stock as a tracked action.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, RECOVERY, DEGRADED.

MCF-SUP-018 Lead Times

Claim designAssurance level AL2Tier CP-1Evidence floor S3Supports CG-10, CG-03

Objective. Lead times for long-lead equipment (power transformers, MV switchgear, generators, UPS systems, chillers and dry coolers, CDUs, accelerator systems, high-speed optics, switch hardware) are known, tracked and compared with recovery and growth needs, so that both failure replacement and planned expansion are realistic.

Requirement and evidence

The procurement lead shall maintain current quoted and observed lead times for each long-lead equipment class, including manufacturing slot reservations and logistics time, and the capability owner shall compare each with (a) the recovery tolerance for loss of an installed unit and (b) the capacity growth schedule, recording each case where lead time exceeds tolerance or schedule with a treatment (strategic spare, slot reservation, framework order, design change) or acceptance.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E7 Derived and analytical. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL, RECOVERY.

MCF-SUP-019 Logistics Continuity

Claim resilienceAssurance level AL5Tier CP-5Evidence floor S5Supports CG-10, CG-05

Objective. The logistics and labour needed for recovery and urgent replacement (heavy-haul transport and route permits for transformers and generators, port and customs clearance, cross-border movement under export controls, emergency fuel delivery, and mobilisation of specialist labour such as HV jointers, commissioning engineers, OEM field engineers and liquid-cooling technicians) can be delivered within recovery tolerance under declared regional disruption.

Requirement and evidence

The recovery owner shall identify the logistics and specialist-labour prerequisites for each recovery scenario involving replacement of long-lead equipment or emergency resupply, shall secure them through contracts or pre-arrangements (heavy-haul contractors, route surveys, customs brokers, export licences, fuel priority, labour call-off agreements), and shall validate them by exercise or documented precedent at the profile interval, including under at least one regional-disruption assumption.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational; E4 Validation and test. Optional: E5, E6, E7. Operating states: EMERGENCY, RECOVERY.

MCF-SUP-020 End-of-Life Planning

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-03

Objective. End-of-sale, end-of-support and obsolescence of critical hardware, firmware and control platforms (PLCs, BMS/EPMS controllers and servers, UPS models, protection relays, accelerator generations, switch OS, storage platforms) are anticipated and managed before support or parts cease.

Requirement and evidence

The asset manager shall maintain a lifecycle register recording vendor end-of-sale and end-of-support dates for critical assets, shall review it at the profile interval, and shall ensure each asset reaching end-of-support within the planning horizon has an approved treatment (refresh, last-time buy, extended support, third-party support with compensating controls) recorded before the date.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL.

SUP-06 Remote support and third-party access

MCF-SUP-021 Support Identity

Claim implementationAssurance level AL3Tier CP-2Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-13

Objective. Every person from an OEM, integrator, maintenance contractor or managed-service provider who can access facility or AI infrastructure, remotely or on site, is individually identified and authenticated; shared vendor accounts and default credentials do not exist.

Requirement and evidence

The security owner shall require that all third-party support access to BMS/EPMS, CDU and PLC systems, UPS and switchgear management interfaces, BMCs, cluster managers, fabric and storage controllers uses named individual identities, verified by the supplier and registered by the owner, with multi-factor authentication for remote access. Shared, generic and default vendor accounts shall be disabled or, where technically unavoidable, vaulted with per-use checkout bound to a named person and recorded as an exception.

Evidence required: E1 Documentary and declarative; E2 Configuration and technical state. Optional: E3, E4, E5. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SUP-022 Activation and Approval

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Critical to CG-15Supports CG-14

Objective. Third-party remote access to facility and AI infrastructure is off by default and is enabled only for an approved, time-limited, asset-scoped session linked to a work order or change.

Requirement and evidence

The facility operator shall ensure that third-party remote access paths are disabled by default and are activated only on approval by an authorised owner representative, for a stated duration and set of target assets, referencing an approved ticket or change, through a brokered access gateway. Access shall be deactivated automatically at expiry. Emergency activation shall follow a defined path with retrospective review within the profile time.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SUP-023 Session Monitoring

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15

Objective. Third-party sessions on control-plane and OT systems are recorded and, for high-consequence systems, monitored in real time by a competent owner representative able to terminate the session.

Requirement and evidence

The security owner shall record all third-party sessions to in-scope control-plane and OT systems (keystroke or screen recording through the access broker where feasible), shall require live monitoring by a competent owner representative for sessions to systems designated high-consequence (for example EPMS switching, BMS/CDU control, protection relay configuration), and shall retain recordings for the profile period. The owner representative shall have and use the means to terminate a session.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL, MAINTENANCE, EMERGENCY.

MCF-SUP-024 Revocation and Review

Claim operationAssurance level AL4Tier CP-3Evidence floor S4Supports CG-15, CG-13

Objective. Third-party logical and physical access is revoked promptly when no longer needed and is periodically recertified, so that access does not outlive the person, contract or task.

Requirement and evidence

The security owner shall revoke third-party logical access, credentials, tokens and physical badges within the profile time of contract end, personnel departure notified by the supplier, or task completion, and shall recertify all third-party access with the owning system owner at the profile interval, removing any access not positively confirmed.

Evidence required: E2 Configuration and technical state; E3 Operational and observational. Optional: E4, E5, E6. Operating states: NORMAL.

Source: controls.csv, evidence-profiles.csv and gate-mappings.csv.